| 王 晴.引入监督机制的政府信息公开演化博弈研究[J].中国科技资源导刊,2014,(2):50~57 |
| 引入监督机制的政府信息公开演化博弈研究 |
| Evolutionary Game Analysis about Government Information Publicity underMedia Supervision Perspective |
| 投稿时间：2014-01-05 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 政府信息公开；演化博弈；复制动态；演化稳定策略；媒体监督 |
| 英文关键词: government information publicity, evolution game, replicator dynamics, evolutionary stable
strategy, media supervision |
| 基金项目: |
| 作者 | 单位 | | 王 晴 | 山西大学经济与管理学院，山西太原 030006 |
|
| 摘要点击次数: 1978 |
| 全文下载次数: 2089 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 政府信息公开是法律制度和行政行为的有机结合，根据《政府信息公开条例》的规定，政府部门有及时公
开信息的责任和义务。申请行为和公开行为都需要付出一定的费用或劳动，在引入监督机制的情形下，设定若干假设
及参数，对政府部门、公众与媒体等三方博弈做无差异分析，结合演化稳定策略及其相应的相位图做具体分析，由此
导出启示和建议，并对分析过程做出结论性判定。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Government information publicity is the organic combination of legal system and administrative
behavior which are existing simultaneously, According to the provisions of the Ordinance, government
departments are required to disclose their public information. Application behavior and publicity behavior
need pay a certain degree of costs or labor, After introduced the monitoring mechanisms, this paper Set several
assumptions and parameters, made no difference analysis of three main types of the information subjects,
constructed appropriate game models, analyzed them by using replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable
strategy, exported revelations and some targeted suggestions based on the specific analysis, and then it gives the
corresponding conclusions. |
|
查看全文
查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
| 关闭 |
|
|
|
