王 晴.基于演化博弈的政府信息公开行为优化研究[J].中国科技资源导刊,2014,(2):39~49 |
基于演化博弈的政府信息公开行为优化研究 |
Analysis and Optimization of Government Information Publicity Basedon Evolution Game |
投稿时间:2013-12-23 |
DOI: |
中文关键词: 政府信息公开;主体行为;演化博弈;复制动态;演化稳定策略;雅可比矩阵 |
英文关键词: government information publicity, participants’ behavior, evolution game, replicator dynamics,
evolutionary stable strategy, Jacobian Matrix |
基金项目: |
作者 | 单位 | 王 晴 | 山西大学经济与管理学院,山西太原 030006 |
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摘要点击次数: 2026 |
全文下载次数: 2495 |
中文摘要: |
根据《政府信息条例》的规定,政府信息公开分为主动公开和依申请公开两种类型,在客观分析不同类型
下的信息主体的成本收益前提下,构建政府部门群体之间,政府部门与公众之间等两类博弈模型,运用复制动态和演
化稳定策略对此进行动态演化分析,提出针对性的对策建议,为进一步优化政府信息公开提供科学的理论参考。 |
英文摘要: |
According to the provisions of Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of
Government Information, government Information Publicity is divided into two types, they are voluntarily
disclosed and discloses through application, analyzed different types the costs and benefits of the information
subject, constructed several types of game models, analyzed them by using replicator dynamics and
evolutionary stable strategy, proposed some targeted suggestions, provide scientific and theoretical reference for
government information publicity optimization. |
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